Thesis Summary
The Israeli strike against Iranian targets may have been a tactical success, but real strategy demands long-term vision. The only viable strategic endpoint with Iran is regime change—not invasion, but internal collapse. Yet the West, distracted by narrative confusion and short-termism, seems ill-equipped to pursue this path. The real danger isn't just the strike—it's our inability to frame it as part of a coherent, sustained campaign.
Introduction – Tactical Success or Strategic Blunder?
On 13 June, Israel launched a targeted operation against Iran's military and political leadership, killing high-ranking members of the Revolutionary Guard along with nuclear scientists and officials. Iran retaliated with a wave of over 500 ballistic missiles and 1,000 drones. Nine days later, the United States entered the fray, deploying B-2 bombers armed with bunker-busting munitions to strike three Iranian sites. The full extent of the damage is not yet known.
What is clear, however, is that the tactical picture tells only part of the story. The deeper question is strategic: was this a deliberate step in a broader campaign, or a high-risk reflex?
In warfare, as in politics, the real challenge is not action—it is direction. Strategy is not just about what you do; it's about what you're aiming at. And increasingly, it seems the West no longer knows.
Why Iran Remains a Threat to the West
Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the country has undergone a fundamental ideological transformation. This was not merely a political coup but an Islamic revolution—a deliberate rejection of Western liberalism, secular nationalism, and modernity itself. Led by Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolution aimed to return Iran to ultra-orthodox Shia Islamic rule and to export that revolutionary model across the Muslim world.
Its central enemy has always been the United States, described by Khomeini as the "Great Satan," and Israel, branded as a cancerous "Zionist regime" to be wiped from the map. These are not fringe slogans—they are central to the regime's worldview and have been institutionalised in Iranian foreign policy ever since.
Since the revolution, there has been a marked increase in terrorism and instability across the Middle East—much of it traceable to Iran's influence:
- Hezbollah in Lebanon
- The Houthis in Yemen
- Shia militias in Iraq and Syria
- Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza
All have received support, arms, or direct funding from Tehran. The Quds Force—the foreign operations arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—has functioned less like a national defence body and more like an imperial instrument of ideological expansion.
The West cannot afford to view the Iranian regime as just another regional actor. It is an exporter of violent revolution, sustained by oil revenues and an unrelenting belief in its mission.
There Is Only One Endgame: Regime Change
Iran is populated by the Iranian people or Persians. Their civilisation is more than 7,000 years old and they have never been fully conquered. Alexander the Great, the Mongols, and the Arab Muslim conquest in the 13th century all devastated Persia, but ultimately the civilisation persisted. In modern history, Iran was never colonised and it has remained nominally independent. This is in large part due to its geography—it is a mountainous region.
As a result, land invasion is out of the question. Even bombing Iran is not easy, since there are several countries between Iran and Israel, including Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. It is one of nature's great fortresses.
Its ideological regime can't be co-opted or contained in the long term. Iran's leadership is not merely pragmatic—it is driven by a deeply rooted worldview that sees the Islamic Revolution as a global project. Attempts to negotiate, placate, or reintegrate Iran into a "rules-based international order" assume a willingness to compromise that does not exist at the ideological level.
The regime's foundational identity is built around resistance to Western influence and the exportation of its theocratic model. Containment might buy time, but it cannot neutralise a regime that sees enmity with the West as a religious and historical imperative.
Netanyahu of Israel understands this. His strategy—notably targeting the IRGC rather than the conventional army—reflects a deliberate attempt to degrade the regime's ideological infrastructure. Whatever one thinks of Netanyahu domestically, he does operate with a long-term geopolitical horizon. He knows that wars of ideology are not won quickly.
The strategy must be to weaken the ideological foundations of the regime until collapse becomes inevitable.
Sabotage vs Bombing – The Value of Plausible Deniability
Sabotage and covert operations offer something of great value in this day and age: plausible deniability. What matters is not the size of the explosion—but the silence that follows when the enemy's programme stalls. The problem with bombings and an aerial war is that they invite escalation, fuel nationalist sentiment, and risk a loss of narrative control.
Covert operations such as Stuxnet have proved more effective. In that case, a sophisticated cyberattack caused centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear facility to spin out of control and then shut down. It is estimated to have set back the nuclear programme in Iran by one to two years. It was the first known cyber weapon to cause physical destruction—and it did so silently, without giving Iran a clear enemy to strike back against.
Other examples include:
- Targeted assassinations of nuclear scientists—some carried out remotely, such as with satellite-controlled machine guns
- Mysterious fires and unexplained explosions at sensitive facilities
Each incident chips away at the regime's credibility and its internal confidence.
The US and Strategic Drift
The bombings undertaken by the US certainly mark a departure from its doctrine of restraint. Traditionally, the US would not conduct a pre-emptive strike unless there was overwhelming evidence of an imminent threat—ideally with UN backing. There is a good reason for this doctrine: it helps preserve the moral high ground and portrays military action as a last resort, enabling strategic ambiguity.
Striking first risks handing the regime a propaganda opportunity—allowing it to claim victimhood. It also invites escalation, and it is not clear whether the US has a coherent plan if that happens.
This strategic drift did not begin with Trump. It has developed across multiple administrations as public appetite for intervention has waned and institutional expertise has eroded. But it accelerated sharply under Trump, whose White House sidelined experts and hollowed out planning structures.
Leaders like Putin, Xi, and Netanyahu think in decades. Trump seems to think in days.
While there can be value in direct confrontation, a strategy reliant on reflexes rather than vision is dangerous. The long-term posture of deterrence, diplomacy, and strategic patience has been disrupted—perhaps permanently.
The Information War – The Battle We're Losing
The information war surrounding Iran is not defined by outright lies, but by omissions—of context, history, and ideology. Broadcasters like the BBC do not explicitly endorse the Iranian regime, and their interviews often include pointed questions. But the effect is more subtle—and more corrosive.
In seeking continued access and avoiding offence, journalists often omit the most damning facts: Iran's funding of proxy militias like Hezbollah and the Houthis, its open calls for the destruction of Israel, and its long history of regional subversion.
These are not fringe activities—they are central to the regime's identity and strategy. Yet in interviews, regime officials are allowed to speak as victims of Western aggression, presenting their nuclear programme as peaceful and their foreign policy as defensive.
Without clear contextual challenge, this narrative gains traction. The result is a kind of passive distortion: not through falsehoods, but through selective framing—one that misleads Western audiences, softens political resolve, and erodes public support for robust action.
In that space, the regime wins a vital advantage: it sets the tone of the conversation, while the West ties itself in knots trying to appear fair.
Conclusion – Strategy Demands Vision, Not Just Action
It is difficult to tell at this stage what effect the American bombing has had on Iran's nuclear programme. It may have caused a serious setback for the regime—in which case, the White House may feel justified. But it is not yet clear, and the big question now is how Iran will respond.
On the face of it, the strike seems justified and effective. But the deeper concern is whether it formed part of a coherent US strategy or was simply a high-risk reflex. If regime change is the ultimate goal, then every act must build toward it. Tactical success is not enough.
Israel's approach—focused, ideologically aware, and deliberately aimed at the regime's internal architecture—contrasts sharply with the United States' uncertainty. While Netanyahu appears to think in decades, successive American administrations have too often acted on impulse or election cycles.
There is also the question of opportunity cost. The world is entering a phase of strategic realignment—the rise of China, the tightening grip of autocracies, the breakdown of global trade guarantees, and the prospect of resource-driven conflicts. Against this backdrop, a long entanglement with Iran—however justified tactically—may become a strategic distraction.
It is not that Iran isn't dangerous. It is that it may not be the most important danger.
If Israel is indeed playing the long game, it's not clear that its most important ally is playing the same one.
We may have struck Iran's bunkers. But unless we learn to think in decades, we're still missing the target.